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A stochastic  general  equilibrium model is constructed  in which an analysis  can  be conducted  into
the effects  of-various  diitortional govemment  policies  on the behavior  offinancial market  variables'
In particular, a tax on transactio-ns  in assets  ind  a capital gains  tax are studied separately. The
effects  of these  policies  on the equilibrium  behavior  of capital  prices,  rates  of return, and the level
of transaction  .,tlrme  are quantified. Additionalln some  estimates  of the welfare costs  of such
policies  are presented.  Althbugh the motlel  is a  version  of the representative  agent  framework  with
ii1n"-."purubl" preferences,  iiis  also shown  that it can generate  an endogenous  distribution of
wealth.I.  INTRODUCTION
In this paper a stochastic  general  equilibrium infinitely-lived  agent  model is constructed  in which
it  is possible  to analyze  the impact that various govemment policies have on the behavior of
financial market variables.  In  particular, an investigation  is conducted into how increases  in
transactions  costs,  possibly  viewed as a tax on the purchase  or sale  of assets'  can influence the
dynamic properties of  the price and rate of  return of capital, as well as on the equilibrium
transaction  volume. Additionally,  within the context  of a similar model an analysis  is conducted  to
study  the impact of the implementation  of two versions  of a capital  gains  tax and its effect  on the
financial market variables. This is an important breakthrough  because  there appears to be a
remarkable  shortage  of dynamic  general  equilibrium  models  that are used  to study  the impact that
such  distortional fiscal  policies  have  on the equilibrium  behavior  of financial market variables'
It has  been occasionally  suggested  by some  researchers  that it might be appropriate to imPose  a
government  tax on the purchase  or sale  of financial  assets,  with the apparent  goal being to deter
large fluctuations  in prices that are associated  with large transaction  volume.  Since it has  been
empiricatly  documented  that transaction  volume  is  positively  correlated  with the magnitude  of price
changes,  it may be thought that a policy that seeks  to lower the volume of transactions  may also
lower the volatility of prices.  Similarly, the imPosition  of a capital gains tax has been a much
discussed  poliry considercd  recently  in the u,s.  However,  to date there has been a dearth of
literatur€ that attempts  to study  such  issues.  In Particular,  there have  been  practically  no analyses
that have  studied  the impact  of such  policies  within the context  of a stochastic  general  equilibrium
model. It may  be  especially  imJnrtant  to study  these  policies  within  such  a context,  since  it is  only
within a fully articulated  general  equilibrium model that the full feedback  effects  of such  a poliry
on  all  the  endogenous  variables,  such  as  the  price  ofcapital  and  the  volume  of transactions'  can  be
fully revealed.  Additionally, in such  models  it is also  possible  to estimate  the cost,  in welfare  terms,
ofsuch policies. l,astly, the model can also  be used  to show  how the dynamics  of th6 distribution
of wealth or assets  among  the population  can  change  over time'
Much of the work on gene  ral equilibrium  models  of asset  pricing  have  virtually no implications  for
the behavior  of transaction  volume for these  same  economies.  This is particularly  true for models
employing  the representative  agent paradigm  [e'g' Lucas (1987)]'  The model employed in this
papermakesuseofavcrsionofthisrepresentativeagentmodeltoobservehowtheleveloftransaction  volume  can  be affected  by policies  affecting  agents  investment  decisions.  The approach
adoPtedinthispaperhastheaddedbenefitofdisptayingagentsthatcanparticipateintheasset
market for virtually any number of periods  - no matter how short or long a period of time -  an
apparentlyratherrealisticpropertythatisnotablyabsentinmostothermodelsofassetpricing.
This model can then be viewed  as a contribution to the literature using  the infinitely-lived agent
modelling construct, so that it  can be shown how this paradigm can be employed to address
additiona|questions.Infact,thernodelpresentedinthispaperhastheinfinitely-lived
representative  agent model, and the two-period-lived  overlapping  generations  model as special
cases.
This paper  is also  a mntribution to the recent  and  growing  literature that emPloys  dynamic  general
equilibrium models  to study  the impact,  both in terms  of welfare  and the behavior  ofthe  resulting
aggregates,  of various  govemment  policies' Lucas (198?)  uses  a representative  agent model and
concludes  that the fluctuations  in consumption  arising  over the course  ofthe business  cycle  are not
sufficiently  large to justi!  employing  govemment  policy tools to combat  the fluctuations. cooley
and Hansen (1987)  use  a sirnilar  framework  to calculate  the effects  of different monetary  Policies
that produce alternative  inflation taxes. Greenwood  and Huffrnan (1991)  study the impact that
alternative labor and capital income taxes have on the business  cycle properties of  the u's'
economy,  and on the welfare  of agents  who live in such  an economy' In the present  analysis  a tax
on exchanges  of ftnancial  assets,  as  well as  two versions  of a capital  gains  tax  will be analyzed't It
will be shown how these policies affect the equilibrium behavior of the endogenous  variables'
Additionauy, some  measures  of the change  in agents'  welfare as  a result of such  policies  will also
be presented.
The remainder of the paper is organized  as follows.  In Section  II  the economic  environment
without transaction  costs  is described, It is a version  of a representative  agent  economy  in which
agents  enter or leave  the economy  depending  on a realization  of a random  variable. Agents can
purchase  or sell  capital  from one period to the next,  and  can finance  their consumption  activity  by
changing  their portfolio accordingly. The agent's  decision  rules and the economies'  equilibrium
conditions  are characterized.  A non-stochastic  version  of the model is briefly studied  so as  to gain
insight into the behavior of the steady-state  distribution of wealth over time'  This is important
because  it is usually  assumed  that representative-agent  models  populated  by infinitelylived agentsare reticent on the issue  of the distribution of wealth.  In Section III  the model is altered to
incorporate  a transaction  cost  on the purchase  and  sale  of assets.  Numerical results  are presented
to show  how changing  the level  of transaction  costs  will affect  the stochastic  properties  of the price
of capital, the rate of return on capital,  and the level of transaction  volume.  In Section  IV  the
motlel is modified to incorporate two versions  of a capital gains tax that is payable,  period by
period, by agents. It is shown  that such  a tax  can influence  the serial  correlation properties  of the
price of capital. Again, numerical  results  are presented  to show  how changing  the level of this tax
will affect  the stochastic  properties  of the financial  market  variables. Final remarks  are presented
in Section  V.
II.  ECONOMICEI.IVIRONMENT
The  economy  is  one  in which  time  is  discrete,  and  indexed  by t=7,2,3...  Initially  at date  t=1 there
are a continuum  of agents  in the economy,  and this population  is said to be of size  N.  For
convenience,  the population  size  is normalized  to unity. For all agents  that are in the economy  at
date t, their preferences  can  be described  by the following utility function
where p  e  (0, 1).  At  each  date t, aN of the existing  agents  leave  the economy,  and aN "new"
agents  enter the economy  where a €  (0, l).'? Agents  know at the beginning  of a period whether
or not they  must  leave  the  economy  at the  end  ofthat period. In any  period  t, the  probability  that
an agent  will have  to leave  the economy  in the following  period is  a, and this probability is identical
for all agents  and for all periods.3 In other words, the probability that an agent who has  been
pr€sent  for only one period  will leave,  is equal  to that probability for an agent  who had been  there
for many periods.
Agents  can  buy  and  sell  capital  on the  capital  market. It is  assumed  lhat there  exists  an  aggregate
supply  of one unit of capital,  which produces  a stochastic  dividend  of r, in period t.  In any  period
t, an agent  (j) may  enter  the economy  with  xj,  units  of capital,  The  price  of capital  in this  period
is P,, quoted in units of the consumption  good. The agent  can then decide  whether to purchase
more capital,  or to sell  some  of his existing  stock  to finance  current  consumption.  With this  in
mind,  the optimization  problem  for an  agent  who  was  in the economy  in both periods  t and  t+1
uIirux..r],is to maximize  the following expected  utility function
r Ilfrtos(c,)l
t.l
subject  to the budget constraints  for s > t,
c,*P"r,.r=(P"+r")x,'
Here the €xpectation  operator reflects  thc expectation  with respect  to future prices and rates  of
return, as  well as  the probability (c!)  that the agent  will leave  the market. In any  period s  when  aN
agents  enter the economy,  they each enter with w. units of the single consumption good as an
endowment. Therefore, these agents  maximize  the utility function (1) subject to the following
budget  constraint
c, + P x"., <  w,.
The realization of the variable w3  occurs  prior to or simultaneously  with the entrance of these
agents  into the economy,  This precludes  any  risk-sharing  agreements  that could  be arranged  based
on the realization  of the level  of this  variable. As a benchmark,  and in order to make  the behavior
of the model conform  with that of the data,  it will be assumed  below  that both the dividend (r,) and
endowment  (w)  are comJnsed  of the sum of a stochastic  i,i.d. random variablq  and a common
trend element  so that aggregate  output exhibits  growth as follows
log(w,)=ll+sr
log(r,)=t|'+€?.
Lastly,  for those  agents  who know they  are spending  their last period in the economy,  they merely
consume  the  value  of all their assets  before  leaving.  Therefore,  their budget  constraint  is as  follows
c, <(P, , r,')xr.
It should  be noted that since  there are a continuum  of agents  and the fraction a of agents  will be
leaving  the economy,  then the fraction  a of aggregate  caPital  must  be sold  by agents  as  well. This
places  a lower bound, but only a lower bound,  on the transactions  volume in any period.
(1)
(2)Equilibrium Witbout Transactions  Costs.
It  is straightforward to solve the model described  above,  and characterize  its behavior'  The
dynamic  programming problem can then be cast as follows'  Let v[(\  +  r')a]  denote the value
function for an agent  who enters  period t with x, units of the asset,  and the price and dividend are
P, and r, respectively,  Then the dynamic  programming  problem faced  by such an agent can be
written as
VI(P, + r,  ).r,I = max{log(c,  )+Ep[(1  - a\Vl(P,.,  * r,.')4.,1 * alog([P,.r * lrl4.r)]l  (3)
where the maximization is subject to  equation (2)  and rhe expectation  oPerator reflects the
expectation  with resp€ct  to future prices  and dividends,a  After some  manipulatlon,  it is possible
to veriff that the Euler equation  associated  with this problem is the following
[-"a-"]  i"=*5-l  .[*+-]
where
| ,,*,.,  I '=[-(r,-',Ej'




D-  -l  t-  llP  trlr '*,,r - 
[1[-aF]lr', 
',r-r'
Hence,  the level of savings  or investment  is a decreasing  function  of a, the rate at which agents
leave  the economy,  but an increasing  function  ofB, the discount  factor, The higher  is a, the shorter
is the expected  horizon  over  whi'ch  the agent's  optimization  problem  takes  Place,  and hence  the less
they  will wish  to save  for filture consumption.  When  a = 0, the savings  rate  is equal  to the discount
factor (p), which  conforms  with what is known  about  emnomies  in which the technolosl is constant
returns,  and  preferences  are  logarithmic'5




where f,l, is the set of agents  who will be in the e@nomy  in both p€riods t and t+1'  while f,!,'
represents  the s€t  of agents  who first enlered  the economy  in period t, and x,r  denotes  the amount
of capital chosen  by agent  j in period t-1, to be held until the following period.  of  course,  this
equation merely  states  that the demand  for capital  must equal tbe supply'6
Similarly, it is easily shown that for agents  who are just entering the economy,  their portfolio
decision  is described  by the following
"".,  =  [r.3al]"
(5)
(6)
substitution of equalions  (a) and (6) into equation  (5) then yields  the following equation  defining
the equilibrium price of caPital
P=
|fow, * (1 - c)r,l (7)
l!;cP  -F(1 -")l
of  course,  fluctuations  in the variables  wt' rt' or even  if a were free to fluctuate,  would produce
changes  in the price of capiral  and hence  in the rate of return, Notice that a high realization  of c
raises  the size  ofthe denominator,  and  thus  helps  to lower  the price  ofcapital, because  more capital
is being supplied  through those  agents  exiting  the economy' On the other hand if w, > r" then a
high realization  ofa  will raise  the numerator  and raise  the price  of capital,  because  newly  entering
agentshavelargeendowmentsandtheirsavingswillthendriveupthepriceofcapital.Becausethe
probability of exiting the economy  (a) is the same  for all agents,  the wealth distribution has no
impactonthepriceofcapital.However,aswillbeshownbe|ow,themodeliscapableofgenerating
an endogenous  distribution of wealth  or capital  holdings'
The Non-siochastic  Steady  State
To gain insight into the behavior  of the model, it  seems  best at first to shut off all sources  of
exogenous  uncertainty. It is then possible  to utilize  this framework  to charactelize  the steady-statedistribution of capital holtlings,  and also  to see  how the distribution of wealth €volv€s  over time.
This can be done through the following  two examples.
Examnle  1: Let the  parameter  values  be  as  follows:  I=  '95'a ='10, r=  30'w = 50'  for all time
periods. Furthermore, consider  the extreme  benchmark  case  in which at time t =  1, all existing
capital is owned  equi-proportionally  by lOEo  of lhe existing  agents  in the economy. Since  there is
only one unit of aggregate  capital,  initially the agents  who hold capital  need  to each  hold ten units.
Figure  1  then shows how the wealth distribution changes  over time  in  this non-stochastic
environment,  beginning  from these  initial conditions. Here the horizontal  axis  measures,  from left
to right, the poorest  percentage  of the population,  while the vertical axis  measures  the amount of
capital held by that poorest  percentage  of the population. Initialty at t=1  tbe poorest  9070  of the
population  holds zero capital. As time evolves,  the poorer agents  in the population gradually  get
richer only because  of new agents  entering  the economy. Existing  npoor"  agents  do not get richer,
but instead  merely leave  the economy. On the other hand,  the very rich agents  actually  get richer
because  they are  saving  some  of their earnings  from capital,  and  hence  become  even  more wealthy.
Asymptotically  the distribution of capital  approaches  the steady  state  distribution, which is shown
by the dashed  line in Figure 2.? Note that for visual  convenience  the vertical axis  of Figure 2 is
measured  in units of the klgarithm of the quantity  of capital. In the steady  state new entrants  to
the economy  enter  with relatively  little wealth,  and  gradually  save  more over their lifetime. Hence'
in Figure 2, as agents  get older they are getting richer' and are moving from the left to the right
in the distribution of capital holdings. It  should also be noted that various parameters  of the
environment  influence  the distribution  of capital  holdings.  To illustrate  this,  the solid line in Figure
2 denotes  the steady-state  distribution  ofcapital holdings  for the exact  same  economy  as  the dashed
line, except  that the dividcnd is r =  10. In this case  the Iatc of return on capital is lower, and
therefore agents are slower to  acquire more capital over their lifetime,  Consequently  the
distribution appears  to be flatter in this second  case.
Example  2: I.,et  the  parameter  values  be  as  follows:  9=  '95,c = .10,  r =2,w  = 50,  for all time
periods. Again suppose  that at time t =  1, all existing  capital is owned by 107o  of the existing
agents  in the economy. Figure 3 then shows  the evolution  of the wealth distribution over time. In
contrast  to Figure 1, the rich agents  who  stay  in the economy  actually  get poorer over time because
they are consuming  more and more of their earnings  from assets. The reason  for the differentbehavior  of the wealth distribution in the second  example  is that the rate of return on capital is
lower than in the first example, In this case  the distribution of capital  converges  to that shown  by
the dashed  line in Figure 4.  Obviously,  this example  is the converse  of Figure 2 because  agents
here are depleting  their capital holding  over their lifetime.  Hence new entrants to the economy
enter relatively wealthy,  and consequently  move from the right to the left in the distribution of
Figure 4. Again, it is shown  in Figure 4 that raising  the dMdend from r=2 to r=5 means  shifting
the steady-state  distribution from the dashed  line to lhe solid line.  In this case  raising  the rate of
return  makes  the distribution  "flatter."
In both of the above examples,  the distribution of capital holdings moves  'fastern towards the
eventual  steady  state, the higher is parameter  a.  For example,  if c  =  1, then all agents  in the
economy  at time t=1 leave  the next Period,  and the economy  immediately  goes  to the new steady
state. Similarly,  the distribution  ofcapital holdings  moves  "faster'  towards  the eventual  steady  state,
the higher is w relative to r,  In this case,  new entrants  can then afford to purchase  more capital
and thereby raise  the share  of capital  held by new entrants. Additionally, the behavior of capital
holdings  is more likely to look like Figures  1 and  2, as  opposed  to Figure 3 and 4, the higher is the
savings  rate (s), and  the lower is the endowment  lerrel  (w) relative  to that ofthe  dividend (r).  The
higher is the savings  rate s (or the level ofp),  the more saving  will take place,  and so the more
capital the rich agents  will purchase,  The higher  is the dividend  (r) relative  to the endowment  (w)'
the higher the rate  of return to holding  capital,  and the more capital  the rich agents  will purchase.
These types  of experiments  can be conducted  for stochastic  and non-stochastic  versions  of the
economy. Also, given an arbitrary initial distribution for wealth,  the r€sulting  wealth distribution
for an arbitrary finite number of periods  can be calculated  as  well.
In the stochastic  economies  of the following two sections,  the wealth distribution will behave  in a
manner similar to that displayed  in Figures  3 and 4, since  the participants  in the financial market
will let their capital  holdings  erode  to finance  higher  consumption  levels. However, the chang€  in
the distribution of capital holclings  will obviously  be influenced  by the rate of return on capital
which,  as  will be shown,  will be influenced  by the various  govemment  policies  under consideration.
In the following section  an increase  in transaction  costs,  possibly  viewed  as a tax on transactions'
will be analyzed  within a vcrsion  of the present  model. In Section  IV two versions  of a capital  gains
tax  are  implemented  in this  model  to study  the  impact  on  thc  equilibrium  financial  market  variables.These  policies  are implemented  separately,  as  opposed  to simultaneously'  to facilitate the analysis
of each  policy individuallY.
III.  EQULIBRIUM  WITH TRANSACTIONS  COSTS
Now consider  an envlronment  in which there are transaction  msts impos€d  on the purchase  and
sale  of assets.  In particular,  what is considered  is a mnstant tax on the value of the purchase  and
sale  of assets,  calculated  in units of the consumption  good. This mutd altematively  be mnsidered
a natural transaction  cost imposed by the environment on the agent's  behavior' rather than a
govemment  policy  variable. I-€t d denote  the size  of this transaction  cost. Of course'  agents  still
maximize  the preferences  given  by equation  (1), but their budget  constraint  now is changed  to
c, , P1,.,  s (P,  * r,).t,  - 0P,  l(4., - 4)1.  (8)
To facilitate the understanding  of the effects  of such  a policy, equation (8) will be rewritten as
follows
c, *  prx,.t  3  (P, + r,)x, -  VP,(x6 -  xr).
where p obviously  rePresents  the parameter  0 > 0, and is determined  as follows
P = 0, if x,.t > x,
p = -0, if x,., < x,.
This framework permits the analysis  of  the effects of  constant or  linear taxes imposed on
transaction activity, without  the  use  of  artificial  non-linear  (convex or  linear-quadratic)
approximations  that have  been  used  in other analyses'E
Again, the optimization problem for agents  who entel the economy  is to solve  the maximization
problem grven  by equation  (1) subject  to the following  constrainte
c,  + fP,(L  * lt,l)1r,.,  ..,.
The optimization  problem for agents who are leaving the economy is to merely @nsume the value
of their assets,  as given by the following constraintct  = IP,  (1 -  lpl) +  r,l4'
kstly,  for agents  who are in the economy  in both periods  t and t+1, the budget  constraint  for the
optimization problem is described  by equaiion  (3) subject  to equation (8)'  For these  agents'  it is
easily  shown  that the Euler equation  associated  with this problem is then of the following form
[.+a+l  t'-ffi-]  .[*+"]
where s again  is the savings  rate, and is determined  as followsr0
'=h;=tt,
Hence  if p < 0, the addition ofa higher  transaction  cost  raises  the savings  rate of income  since  this
raises  the cost  of future consumption  by raising  the cost  of selling  capital,  and the agent  must then
compensate  for this by saving  more,  or dissaving  less. If  p > 0, the addition of transaction  costs
lowers the savings  rate of  income since this raises the cost of  saving by raising the cost of
purchasing  more assets,  and the agent  will then compensate  for this by saving  less  and consuming
more,  The consumption  and saving  decision  rules  respectively  can then be written as follows
c, = [1 - s][P,(l  + F)  . r',  ]4
r,-,.,  = 
[1j;jlr,(t 
* F)  * r.]4.





It is then easily  shown  for existing  agents  in the economy,  that equation (9) can be emPloyed  to
show  that the value  of the capital  that is traded  or exchanged  by the agent  is of the following form
p,(',.,  -  r, =[rr*#xt*lf,r  -  [t-i;j'#B]",o'
(11)
It is easily  seen  that if p > 0, so that x,*, > x,,  then a further slight increase  in the value of p will
(e)
10reduce  the size  of the first term on the right side  ofequation (11),  and  raise  the value  ofthe second
term, Therefore, holding other things  constant,  a rise in p would tend to deter further purchases
of capital. similarly, if p < 0, so that \+1 < xp then a further lowering  in the value  of p will raise
the size  of the first term on the right side  of equation  (11),  and  lower the  value of the second  term.
Therefore,  holding  the price P,  constant,  an increase  in the value  of the transaction  cost  Parameter
lpl  will lower the value of the assets  that an agent  will wish to purchase  or sell.  This is very
similar to what the addition of a decreasing  returns  to scale  adjustment  cost technologr  to capital
accumulation  will do to a neoclassical  srowth model.
By substituting  the equilibriuft  decision  rules  (9) and (10) into the market-clearing  equation for
capital,  the equilibrium price of capital  can  be determined  as follows. In the case  in which there
are transaction  costs,  this reduces  to
Pr=
Clearly,  wben p > 0, this transaction  cost  causes  the price of capital to be lower than it otherwise
would  be. This is because  in this situation  agents  are  accumulating  capital  over their lifetime (x,*t -
x, > 0), and the higher  transaction  cost  causes  agents  to restrain  their asset  accumulation,  and this
causes  the price of capital to be lower.  Conversely,  when p  < 0, the price of capital would be
higher than otherwise  if the two terms in equation  (12) involving p dominate the absolute  value
term lp l.  In this case,  agents  are selling  capital,  and the higher transaction  cost causes  them sell
less  capital, and this causes  the price of capital to rise. If the effects  of the absolute  value term
lp I dominate  the other two terms  in equation  (12),  then the transaction  cost  of purchasing  capital
by newly  entering participants  in the econorny  dominates  the effect  on the remaining agents,  and
the price of capital  is lower as a result. Setting  F = 0 in equation  (12) gives  the pricing equation
when transaction  costs  are zero, as  given  by equation  (7).
I-astly,  it should  be noted that the previous  analysis  indicates  that there may be a sense  in which
introducing  a tax  on transactions  may  be  beneficial  within the  context  ofother similar environments.
If the tax is set such  that p < 0, then a further decrease  in p, which is a rise in the tax rate, would
also raise  the saving  rate.  To the extent  that it is desirable  to raise the savings  rate because  of
(12)
11other distortions, and thereby possibly raise the level of the capital stock or  growth fate'  a
transaction tax may be one way to accomplish  this task [see Auerbach (1992) for  a similar
discussionl.
Numerical Results:
It is important to obtain a feel for how the imposition  ofa higher transaction  cost  would influence
the dynamic  behavior  ofvariables determined  by the equilibrium  behavior  ofthe asset  market' For
this reason.  the behavior  of several  such  economies  is simulated  and  characterized  below' The size
ofa  period for the model is chosen  to be a quarter,  and dividends  are paid each  quarter.  Before
this experiment  can  be conducted,  specifications  must  be chosen  for the value  of certain variables'
First the discount  factor p must be chosen. As will be seen  below, this was set between '90 and
.9995,  with remarkably  little difference  in the results.
Next, the parameter  a will help det€rmine  the rate at which agents  enter and leave  the economy'
and thereby  influence  the rate at which assets  nturnover.' The rate of turnover of financial assets
in the u.S. has fluctuated  a great deal during this century. Shares  on the bIYsE reached  a local
maximum  of the annual  rate of turnover  of around  100Vo  in 1925. Since  then annual  turnover has
been  considerably  lower, averaging  around  20Vo  per year from 1940  to 1975. Since  1975  turnover
has  increased,  reaching  4OVo  in 1982,  '13%  in 198'1,  and falling to 52Vo  in 1989' Therefore, it was
decided  that a benchmark  value  of the turnover  rate  would be S\Vo.rr The parameter  a then also
determines  the lower  bound  on the level  oftransaction  volume  in any  period since  agents  who enter
or leave  the financial market will obviously  be transacting  in assets'
A  benchmark value for the lwel  of the transactions  cost d must also be chosen.  Since this
represents  the marginal mst of purchasing  or selling  a financial asset,  there are easily  accessible
sources  for such  information. Unfortunately,  there  is a wide range  of values  for such  a parameter'
Retail brokerage  firms can  charge  commission  fees  that can run as  high as  over 374  for purchases
or sales  of assets  (depending  upon  who is doing  the pilfering)'  Firms who have  seats  on the actual
exchanges,  as  well as mutual funds,  who account  for most  of the trading on a day to day  basis,  can
lower  the marginal  cost  of transactions  to below  7vo. Tltercfore,  merely  as  a benchmark,  a marginal
transaction  cost  of lVo for 0 was  chosen.
72Next.  values  for the random  variables  w, and r, must  be chosen'  and this was  done  as follows' The
average  real rate of return on stocks  from 1926  - 1982  was  9vo,  with a standard  deviation  of 21"8Vo
[seelbbotsonandSinquelield(1983)].Thesevariablesarealsoassumedtohaveacommon
deterministic growth or trend component  so that they grow at an annual rtle  of 29Vo' which
conforms  with the observecl  growth in real output from 1929  to 1990. The ratio of wt to r. helps
deterrnine  the average  rate ot'return, with the variability  of both of these  variables  influencing  the
standard  deviation  ofthe  rate of return. Therefore,  both detrended  variables  were assumed  to be
independently  log-normally  distributed  with a common  variance,  and the variance  was chosen  to
mimic the actual  variability of the rate of return'  The ratio of the means  of these  variables  was
chosen  to mimic the actual  average  rate of return on stocks. The independence  assumPtion  was
employed  since  there appeared  to be no obvious  reason  to Presume  a particular degree  of positive
or negative  correlation  between  these  variables'r?
Table 1 shows  the resulting  impact,  for four different economies,  of changing  the transaction  cost
from lvo  to  3vo.rx  For  all  four  economies,  the  model is  calibrated, using half  a  million
observations,  to mimic the behavior  of observed  rates  of return antl turnover of assets  with a lvo
transaction  cost.  This cost is then raised to 3Vo'  As can be seen' the results do not change
markedly  for different values  ofB.  The average  detrended  price of capital rises  by over l4vo, and
the reason  for this is as  follows. The presence  of the higher  transaction  cost  dissuades  asset  holders
from selling assets  as quickly as they might otherwise  wish, and therefore,  their increased  saving
raises  the price ofcapital.  For similar  reasons,  the average  level  of transaction  volume falls  by over
72%. T\isis  largely  due  to the fact that sales  of capital  by existing  agents  declines  leading  to a lise
in price  and a fall in transaction  volume. Additionally,  existing  agents  in the economy  are deterred
by the higher cost from selling  as much capital. This is further illustrated in Figure 5 where an
illustration  of the probability distribution  of transaction  volume  is shown  to have  shifted to the left
because  of  this policy.  Interestingly, the percentage  standard deviation, or  volatility of  the
detrended  price of capital  does  not change  with the increased  transaction  cost. The reason  is that
althoughthemeanpriceishigher,thestandarddeviationisalsohigherbythesameamountand
so the volatility of prices  is not dissipated  by an increase  in tlansactions  costs. This is easily  seen
by  analyzing  equation  (12)  where  it can  be  seen  that  a  decrease  in gt  (< 0)  will raise  the  mean  price
but also  raise  the standard  deviation  of the price.ra  Therefore,  to the extent  that these  transaction
costs  are the effects  of government  taxation  on transactions,  such  a policy  will not produce  a more
tJ,,stable.  behavior for asset  prices  and, in fact, may actually  exacerbate  the variability of prices as
measuredbythestandarddeviationofthedetrendedprice.Thisexperiment,whichshowsthatthe
effect  ofthe higher  transaction  cost  is a fall in transaction  volume and unchanged  level  of volatility
of prices,  also  shows  that the perceived  high  volatility of asset  prices  cannot  be said  to be "caused'
bythehighleveloftransactionvolume,despitethefactthatthetwovariablesarecorrelatedin
equilibrium.
For all four benchmark  economies  described  in Table 1,  the correlation  between  the Price  ofcapital
and transaction  volume is 0.64,  and the correlation  between  the absolute  value of the change  in
price  and  transaction  volume  is  0.12.  These  positive  correlations  are  consistent  with those  described
in  much of  the financial market research,  as described  by Karpoff  (1987)' and gives more
reassurance  that the results of  the policy experiments  can be taken seriously'  However' as
mentionedabove,despitethefactthatthecovariancebetweenthepriceofcapitalandthe
magnitudeorabsoluteva|ueofpricechangesontheonehand,andtheequilibriumtransaction
volume  on the other, is positive,  this does  not imply that a policy  that is designed  to lower volume
willalsolowerpricevariability.Anotherreassuringaspecttotheequilibriumbehaviorofthese
models,  is that the average  dividend  to price  ratios  for each  ofthese benchmark  economies  is 3'97o'
which is relatively  close  to the average  from 1949  - 19m of 4'2Vo'
In Table 1, the variable  Ro  refers  to the annual  rate of return on assets  ignoring transaction  costs'
while R. refers  to the annual  rate  of return  net of transactions  costs.  This last  variable  is calculated
by supposing  the agent  purchases  the asset  at the beginning  ofone year' collects  dividends  during
that year, and  sells  the asset  at the end of that year and pays  the required  transaction  fees  at both
purchase  and sale.rs  For all four benchmark  economies,  when  the transaction  cost  is 0 = 0'01,  the
averagevalueforR.is6.gvo.|ncreasingthetransactionmstsfromT/oto3Tolowerstheaverage
valueforRobyonly0.5/o,butlowerstherat€ofreturnnetoftransactioncostsby4.6vo.The|ast
row in Table 1 shows  how the size  of these  transaction  cost  compare  with the level  of consumption'
onaverage.Infact,thesecostsappeartoberathersmall,beinglessthan05%inallcasessince
such  a small fraction of the assets  are traded  in each  period'
Table2presentssimilarresultsderivedfromraisingthetransactioncostfromTvo|o5vo.T|tisis
averylargepunishmentfortradingassets,andhastheeffectofraisingprices'andlowering
14transaction  volume even  further. The average  annual  rate of leturn, net of transaction  costs  falls
to being negative (from 6.9Vo  to -2,2Vo\. The cost of raising the transaction cost to 57o, as a
percentage  of total consumption,  is slightly  less  than twice that shown  in Table 1.
Table 3 presents  some  measures  of the welfare  cost  of such  a policy  when  p = ,99 and d -  .0716.
The welfare measure  employed  is the equivalent  percentage  tax on an agent's  initial wealth that
would leave  the agent  with exactly  the same  expected  welfare  prior to entering  the market'  In this
case  both levels  of expected  utility (or value  function) are calculated  for the agent  unconditionally
(i.e. as  the value  before  the agent  has  entered  the economy).  Also shown  in Table 3 is the average
amount  of revenue,  measured  as  a percentage  of total consumption,  that this equivalent  tax  would
produce.r6  A comparison  of Tables  1 and 3 shows  the following. A transaction  cost  of37o yields
resources  equal  to 0.39Vo  of.  total  consumption,  whereas  a 2.69Vo  initial wealth tax gives  agents  the
same  exoected  utility. but produces  revenue  on average  equal to 2.53Vo  of total consumption. In
other words,  it would appear  that if such  a transaction  tax  were a feasible  ftscal  policy tool, agents
would have a strong dislike for it, and that the govemment  could generate a given amount of
revenue  at a smaller  dead-weight  loss  by employing  a lump-sum  or, which is the same  thing in this
framework, a wealth tax on agents. The reason  for the agent's  intense dislike of increasing  the
transaction mst  is  that  agents' decisions  in  this framework are motivated by  consumption
smoothing,  and transactions  costs  merely  inhibit this behavior in each  and every  ieriod  and can
thereby  have  a punishing  impact  on welfare.
I-astly,  as  shown  above,  the change  in the transaction  costs  lowers  the rate of return on capital and
changes  the manner  inwhich the distribution  of capital  changes  over time, The higher transaction
costs  also raises  the effective  savings  rate and dismurages  existing  agents  from selling  more units
of capital in successive  time periods.  On the other hand, the lower average rate of  return,
encourages  the existing  agent  to sell  more  capital  to finance  consumption.  It turns  out that the first
effect dominates  the second  so that, for the experiment  conducted  in Figure 3, th€ economy  with
higher transaction  costs  would then not move  as  quick to the steady-state  distribution of capital in
the presence  of the transaction  tax.
IV.  EQULIBRIIJM  WITH A CAPITAL GAINS TAX
The model described  in Scction  II is ideally  suited  to investigate  the implications  of imPlementing
15a version of a capital gains  tax on assets.  To this end, suPpose  that the physical  environment  is
exactly  the same  as  specified  in section  II.  suppose  further that the government  imposes  a tax of
Tontheincteaseinthevalueofanagent'sassetholdingsfromoneperiodtothenext.For
convenience,  and to gain some  insigbt  into the effects  of such  a policy, it is supposed  temPorarily
that decreases  in the value of an agent's  asset  holdings  yield a tax credit or subsidy from the
government. The policy  of imposing  taxes  alone  without subsidies  is also  considered  later'  Again
the government  uses  the resulting  revenue  to spend  on goods  which are used  in some  independent
manner.l7 Therefore, let the agent's  preferences  be given  again  by equation (1)' and for existing
agents  their budset constraint 
:;;"  =;::;,,  -  ,r,  - p,.,)x,
where r  e  [0, 1),  This can then be rewritten as follows
c, * p,X,*,  <  tP,(1 - r)  + r, + rP,-r]xr.
After again  setting  up and solving  the dynamic  progamming problem' it is possible  to show  that
the agents  optimal decision  rule is as follows
,n., -lT.:a'lt",,t  - r) * r,  * rP,-,\x,-
Substituting agents' decision rules into  the market clearing condition (5)  then produces the
equilibrium price of caPital
D- (14)
Ofcourse,settingr=0,producesthepreviouspricingequationforcapitalwithouttaxesor
transaction  costs,  which is re-written  as
D_
It  is interesting to compa(e these two asset pricing equations,  Introducing a capital gains
tax/subsidy  induces  positive  seria[  correlation  into the price  ofcapital where  it need  not have  existed
previously,  and this correlation  is higher,  the higher  is the tax. obviously,  this would  also  affect  the
serial correlation properties  of rates  of return as well.  The reason  for this is as follows- A low
(13)
(7)
Plaw, + (1 - 
")(f 
* nP,-r\l
Blo*, . (1 - c)r,l
16realization of, say,  the dividend r,-,  in the prwious period will drive down the price of capital in
period 11, and help  to increase  the potential  capital  gains  tax payments  of agents  in the subsequent
period (t) when the dividend  would return to its nnormal'level.  Hence agents  in period t will
perceive  this and save  less  because  they  perceive  their wealth to be worth less. This lower level  of
saving  then lowers  the price of capital  in period t.  Hence,  a lower price of capital in the previous
period helps  to lower the price of capital  in the current period.rE
Now it is also  ofinterest to consider  the  impact  of imposing  a capital  gains  tax  alone,  without giving
the agents  a tax subsidy  or rebate  when the price of capital fell.  Fortunately,  the effect of such  a
poliry is easy  to understand  once  one analyzes  both the cases  ofno  tax or subsidy,  and the case  in
which the taxlsubsidy  scheme  is in place. For low realizations  of w, and ro so that the price of
capital falls,  the tax is not relevant  (r  :0),  and the price of capital is determined  by equation (7)'
Additionally, there is oMously no serial  correlation  in the price induced  by the tax since  r  = 0.
Alternatively, when there are high realizations  for the random variables w, and ro the tax is
operative  (r  > 0), and the price of capital  is given  by equation  (14).  Consequently,  there will be
serial mrrelation  in  the price induced by the tax in this case.  Note as well that since the
denominator  of equation  (14) is increasing  in the tax  parameter  (r), for a given  percentage  change
in either  w, or r., tho price  of capital  will respond  in a larger  manner  to decreases  in these  variables'
as  opposed  to increases,  since  the tax  parameter  (r) will tend to be zero  and  hence  the denominator
larger in this instance. Thus there appears  to be an asymmetric  behavior to the Price of capital
induced  by the asymmetric  nature  of the tax parameter  (r > 0).  I-ow reatizations  of either w, and
rr tend to produce  greater  falls  in the price  ofcapital, and  less  serial  correlation  in the price as  well.
Fortunately,  this last  version  of the model  is relatively  straightforward  to analyze  once  the prwious
version is studied. Imposing  the tax alone  on agents  in periods  when the price of capital would
otherwise  be above  its level  from the previous  period  causes  agents  to save  somewhat  less,  but not
so much as to cause  the price to fall below the level from the previous  period.  In fact' in the
experiments  conducted  below,  existing  agents  in the market  continue  to sell  assets  from one period
to the next, and the tax causes  a small  decrease  in the amount  of capital that agents  sell.
Numerical  Results:
Again, in this section  numerical  methods  are employetl  in order to investigate  the impact of this
l7version  of the capital gains  policy on the equilibrium behavior  of the economy. The benchmark
value for the capital gains  policy is arbitrarily chosen  to be r  =0'0'  The benchmark economy  is
again  calibrated  in a manner  similar to that described  in the previous  section. In light of the robust
results  of the previous  section  to changes  in the dismunt factor' in this instance  p was set at '99'
and  the mrresponding  value  for c was  set  at 0.0665.  The probability  distribution for w, and r, were
chosen  in exactly  the same  manner to that described  in the previous  section'
The results  obtained from raising  the capital gains  tax/subsidy  from zero ro SVo  and to 10Vo  arc
displayed  in Table 4. As can  be seen,  the average  price  of capital  is lowered  by a rather negligible
amountbythisPolicy.Additionally,thepercentagevariabilityofthepriceofcapitalislowered
from such  a poliry. The reason  for this is that in the Presence  of the capital gains  taxlsubsidn  the
response  of the price  of capital  to a change  in either  w,  or r, is diminished' Therefore,  to the extent
that various policies  may be instituted to dissipate  the volatility in the prices of assets,  a capital
gains  tax/subsidy  may be seen  as  one possible  avenue  to help perform this task'
Interestingly, the average  level of transaction  volume is marginally lowered by such a policy'
However, the standard deviation of the transaction  volume is dramatically increased'  This is
evidenced  by Figure 6 which shows  the probability  densities  for transaction  volume when r  = 0'0
and 0.10. The reason  for this increase  in variance  is as follows. By calculating  the amount of
capital  purchased  by an agent  from equation  (?), without any tax,/subsidy,  and subtracting  it from
the amount  derived  from equation  (14),  vith the tax/subsidy,  this produces  the following difference
obviouslythistermiszerowhenr:0,butgenerallythisamountcanbepositiveornegative'
consider the case  in which Pr > P,-r,  and  so  the agent  feels  less  wealthy  because  ofthe capital  gains
payment. Also, because  the present  price of capital (\)  is high the cost of purchasing  capital is
high. Both these  effects  make  the agent  purchase  less  capital  than he otherwise  would have  if the
capital gains  tax/subsidy  were not in place. Similarly  when P, < P,.,,  the agent  feels  more wealthy
because  of the  capital  gains  subsidy  that  he  receives,  and  as  well  the  present  price  (P,)  is  low  so  the
costofcapitalislow.Boththeseeffectsreinforceeachothertomaketheagentpurchasemore
canital  than  he  otherwise  would  have.  Hence,  a rise  in the  level  of r will cause  more  variability  in
.'[[?]  4
18the amount of assets  transacted  while reducing  the variability in the price.
Another way to think of this effect is to observe  that €quation  (13) implies that sales  of assets  by
existing  agents  are som€\,hat  more sensitive  to changes  in the price P, (the cost of capital) since
the price in the previous  period  P,.,  now  influences  the agent's  wealth. This is similar to having  the
supply  curve  of assets  become  more price-elastic.  Consequently,  it is of little surprise  to find that
with this changed  shape  of the supply  curve, the price of capital becomes  less  volatile and the
transaction  volume  becomcs  more volatile.
The average  rate of return on capital, igroring transaction  costs,  falls marginally  becaus€  of the
change  in the capital  gains  taxlsubsidy.  Not surprisingly,  the rate  of return, net of transaction  costs'
is lowered  by the capital gains  tax/subsidy.rt  The fall in this rate of return may not be viewed as
being  too substantial,  and  this is due to the fact that the growth rate of prices  is largely  influenced
by the growth rate  of total consumption,  which is the annual rate  of 2.9Vo.  Therefore, the amount
of the tax actually  pai<l  is not substantial. Note also that the standard  deviation of the rates of
return  also  falls.
The nature  of the serial  correlation  of the price  of capital  is illustrated  by Table 5' This shows  how
this correlation  is influenced  by the capital  gains  tax/subsidy,  and this influence  is substantial  given
that both w, and r, are intertemporally  independent-
Tables  6 and 7 show  the impact  on the financial  market  variables  when the capital gains  tax alone
(without the subsidy)  is imposed  on agents. In this case  the average  price of capital is affected
more by the policy, causing  it to fall.  This is due to the asymmetric  behavior, described  above'
induced  in the price of capital by the tax which causes  the price to resPond  in a larger manner to
low realizations  ofw, and r,, as opposed  to high realizations.  The volatility ofthe  price of capital
falls as well, but not as much as when the tax/subsidy  scheme  was implemented. The appar€nt
reason  for this is that when low realizations  for the variables  w, and r, occur, the price of capital
falls  more when  r  :  0. This causes  the price of capital  to be more variable. There is still a small
fall in average  transaction  volume, and a dramatic  increase  in the variability in volume caused  by
the policy. The average  rates  of return on capital,  both ignoring tax€s  and net of taxes,  are not
affccted  as  much  when  the capital  gains  tax  alone  is imposed,  as  compared  with the  joint tax/subsidy
19scheme.Table6alsoshowstheaverageamountofrevenuethatcanbecollectedfromsucha
policl, measured  as  a pelcentage  of aggregate  consumption' A SVo  capital  gains  tax produces  tax
revenue  on average  equal to 2.1'Vo  of  aggregate  consumption' A doubling of the tax from 5To  to
1096  increases  the average  revenue  by |lvo,  T\elast  row of Table 6 also  shows  the equivalent  tax
on initial wealth that would leave  the agent  equally  well off ex-ante,  as  under the relevant  capital
gainstax.Theagentwoul<lbeequallywelloffwitheitheraTovocapita|gainstax,oraltemative|y
giving  up 0,44%  of his initial endowment  uPon  entering  the economy' The number in parenthesis
in the last row ofTable 6 shows  the resulting  average  expected  revenue'  measured  as  a percentage
of total consumption,  that would arise from the wealth tax applied to the initial wealth of agents'
This should  be compared  with the numbers  on the second  Iast  row ofTable 6. For example,  a 107o
capital  gains  tax  yields  the same  discounted  expected  utility as  a 0.44/o  initial wealth  tax on agents'
but the capital  gains  tax produces  tax  revenue  of 3,6%  of total consumption'  whereas  the cquivalent
wealth tax yields revenue  equivalent  to 3.O8vo  of total consumption, The main reason  why the
capital gains tax may not be too punishing  in welfare terms is that it  also tends to lower the
variability of the rate of return on capital,  without lowering  the average  return too much, and this
effect  can  make  risk-averse  agents  better off. Another reason  why the capital  gains  tax may impose
less  of a welfare  burden than the initial endowment  levy is the capital gains  tax may be viewed as
less  deleterious  since  it only works  when  prices  rise,  which is when  wealth is high and the marginal
utility of wealth is low. In contra$t,  the endowment  levy  works irrespective  ofthe  lev€l of wealth'
oneconclusionfromthismaybethatinsomeinstancestheremaybesomewelfarebenefitfrom
reducingtaxeson,say,capitalandlevyingacapitalgainstaxtorecov€rtheresultingrevenue'
Raising  the capital  gains  tax  from 57o  to 70Vo  is actually  capable  of making  agent's  (unconditionally)
better off. This can  be seen  by noting that the equivalent  wealth tax for a 70vo  capital gains  tax is
actually  0.44%,  which is less  than that for  a SVo  capital  gains  tax. This lower  wealth tax also  brings
in|esstaxrevenueasaPercentageofaggregateconsumPtion.Thereasonforthisisthatthelower
variability in the rate of return on capital works to make the agents  better off  and offset the
potential wealth effects  fiom the capital gains  tax'
A  comparison  of the results  from Table 6 with Table 2 shows  that, for example,  ^ 5Eo wrcent
capital  gains  tax,  or the equivalent  0'48%  wealth tax produces  a much higher level of revenue'  as
a percentage  of total consumption,  than the resources  lost through a 57o  transaction  cost'  Thereason  for this is simple. These  transaction  costs  are levied  only on those  capital assets  which are
transacted  in a period, and  the amount  ofthese transactions  is very  small  when the transaction  cost
is Svo. lncontrast, the capital gains  tax has  a much  broader tax base  and is therefore capable  of
producing  much more tax revenue  as  a percentage  of total consumption'
Table 7 also  shows  how the implementation  of the capital  gains  tax causes  serial  correlation in tbe
price  of capital. For the reasons  described  above,  this serial  correlation  is less  than would appear
of it were a tax/subsidy  scheme,  and this is easily  seen  by comparing  Table 7 with Table 5.
I-astly,  it is of interest  to note how  the imposition  of the capital  gains  tax  influences  the distribution
of capital  over time. The lower rate of return on capital  encourages  existing  capital holders  to sell
their capital at a quicker rate, and mnsequently  for the experiment  conducted  in Figure 3' the
distribution of capital holdings  would move quicker to that of the steady-state  in the presence  of
the capital gains  tax than it would otherwise.
V.  FURTHER REMARKS
It has been the goal of this study to analyze  the impact of two distortional fiscal policies on the
behavior of financial  market variables. The analysis  has  been  conducted  within the context of a
funy articulated stochastic  general equilibrium model in which agents'  preferences  and trading
opportunities  are specified,  because  it is only  within the context  of such  a model that the effects  of
various policies  can be studied  while taking into account  how such  policies  affect the equilibrium
of the market.  The model has  been constructed  in such  a manner so that the fiscal policies  can
have  an impact on the equilibrium prices  and rates  of return on capital. Additionally' the model
has the property that distortional fiscal policies  influence  the dynamic properties  of transaction
volume,  an analysis  which is notably  absent  in much  of the existing  literature'
Issues  related  to the production  of goods  or capital  accumulation  have  been ignored in this study.
This is because  the fiscal policies in question have their impact primarily through influencing
consumer  behavior.  Nevertheless,  because  the.  equilibrium interest rates and asset  Prices  are
influenced  by such  policies,  it is clear then that such  policies  would also  influence the amount of
capital  accumulation  within the context  of model  which  had  endogenous  production. For example,
the  implementation  of a higher  transaction  cost  analyzcd  in section  III, resulted  in a higher  price
LIof capital and a lower rate of return to caPital.
to greater caPital accumulation  or  investment
naturally reflects  its scarcity.
It would seem  then that such  a Policy  might lead
to ameliorate the rising price of capital' which
The parameter  c, which determined  the rate at which  agents  enter  and  leave  the economy'  was  set
exogenous|ysoastomimictheobservedaverageturnoverofassets.Holding4constantinthis
manner imposes  some  discipline  on the exercises  conducted,  so that variations  in this Parameter
cannot influence the nature of the results. Ideally one might wish to somehow  endogenize  the
behavior  of agents  who are entering  or leaving  he economy  (see  footnote 2)'  It simply  cannot  be
a complete  story that agents  exogenously  enter or leave  such  an economy,  but instead  they must
do so for a reason. Presumably  one reason  for entering  the market for financial  assets  is that the
rate ofreturn on financial  assets  is sufficiently  high to induce  the participation  of such  agents' one
might expect  that the presence  of capital  gains  taxes  might deter agents  from participating  in the
market,  but this would not necessarily  be the case  if all other asseb  were subject  to the tax as  well'
Therefore,  it seems  sensible  to take seriously  the results  of this paper as  a first approximation.
As shown  above,  various fiscal  policies  can influence  the rate at which agents  wish to buy or sell
assets  when  their goal  is to maximize  utility. The model  does  not have  the property  that agents  are
quickly  buying and selling  different assets  in order to capture  small  expected  gains  in returns (i.e.
churning). It would seem  that having  the govemment  levy a transaction  tax would have a strong
impact  on turnover  done  for this last  reason  since  expected  returns  on different assets  are unlikely
to differ by an amount  sufficient  to offset such  costs'
One might also  ask  about  the effect  of imposing  these  policies  in a model  in which agents  liad some
other avenue  such  as  another  asset,  through  which  wealth  could  be held  so as  to avoid  Paying  either
of the proposed  taxes. of course,  in this instance  the utility-based  costs  would certainly  be less'  but
also  the revenue  raised  for the govemment  would also  be less. One might reasonably  believe  that
th€ relevant  measure  should  be the utility-based  cost  Oer  unit of revenue  raised. In this case,  it is
not clear  that in the presence  of multiple assets,  that this relative  measure  of costs  would be higher
or lower  than  the present  measures.
The results  of Section  III were  interpreted  as  the results  of a government  policy  designed  to tax  theactivity  of transacting  in assets.  Alternatively,  the opPosite  experiment  could  have  been  conducted
of decreasing  the transaction  cost and interpreting  this as the result of an (exogenous)  financial
innovation  which  lowers  the transaction  costs  associated  with transacting  in financial  assets'  In this
instance,  it might be said  that these  innovations  would resuh  in lower average  asset  prices' higher
average  rates  of return, and higher transaction  volume'
In the models  presented  above  an agent's  behavior is motivated by consumption-smoothing,  or
whichisthesamething.utilitymaximization.Anobviousquestionishowtheresultswouldchange
ifadifferentutilityfunctionwereemployed.Considerinsteadofagentshavingpreferences
described  by equation  (1), they  were of the following  relative risk-aversion  variety
pe(1  ' o;.
Then the logarithmic  case  of equation  (1) should  be interpreted  as  the case  corresponding  to p =
l.Ifinsteadp>l,thenitiswellknownthattheagentfindsitmoreimportant,inawelfaresense'
to smooth consumption  across  periods'  In this instance'  one might exPect  the welfare costs  of
Section  III  are certainly  to be magnified  the larger is p'  There is some  evidence  to suggest  that
agents do not substantially  substitute  consumption  intertemporally, and perhaps the numbers
presented  in section  III  then underestimate  these  costs  to some  degree' Similarly, if p < 1' then
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The exact  form of the value function associated  with the problem given in Sections  II and
III is
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where p :  0 for the problem described  in Section  II.  Similarly,  for new entrants  to the
economy  the value function is written as
Vl*,|  = ro + l-rlogfw,l,
where rro and rrr are as defined above.
25FOOTNOTES
1. It should  also  be noted that Auerbach  (1992)  presents  a stimulating  discussion  of the effects  of
a capital gains  tax, and also  studies  the 
"if""t.-oi 
such  a tax within the context of a three-period
economy,
2. It does  not have  to be that the same  number  of agents  leave  and enter  the economy  at the same
time.  However, this assumption  makes  these  disturbances  idiosyncratiq and thereby does not
permit this exogenous  to produce  aggregate  shocks.
It should  also  be noted  that the expectation  operator  in the preferences  above  reflects,  among  other
things,  the fact that in any period  with probability  d the agent  may be leaving  the economy'
3. There are many interpretations  of the parameter  c in this context. This could be interpreted
as the rate at whiih  ug"nt. enter and leave  the caPital  market of this economy. In other words'
(1/a) is the average  iumber  of time periods that.agents spend in this capital market before
tiquiauting all theii assets.  More generally,  one mighi expect  that an agent's  decision  as to leave
oi"nt",  sluch  a capital  market is nit  un 
"*g"ttor,s 
decision,  and is instead  motivated  by their own
decisions  based  on factors  in the environmint.  That is, it could be that agents  might leave  the
capital market because  there exists  some  privately  held (and not Publicly  obsewable)  technolory
to n hi"h they alone  have  access,  such  as  a housing  market,  which will yield a much.  higher rate of
return than they anticipate receiving in  the capital market.  It  would be straightforward to
in-rporut"  su"li a f"atrrr"  into the 
-present 
model, but -would merely serve to complicate the
,"r"iiing  analysis.  The fact that here  ih"  ,u*"  number  of agents  enter and leave  the economy  in
each  pe'riod  merely  makes  the a shocks  idiosyncratic  and abstracts  from aggregate  disturbances  to
the number of agents  participating  in the capital  market'
4. The exact  form of the value function  is shown  in the Appendix'
5.  Of course,  when c  =  1, the model is one in which the population is one-of two-period lived
overlapping lenerations.  Similarly, when c  =  0,  the  model is  one  of  an  infinitelyJived
i"p."riit,"iiuJ  agent. The decision  iule (4) conforms  with what would arise  from these  respective
models.
6. It is assumed  that there cannot  exist  a firm that buys  up all the assets  and issues  its own equity
in an attempt to lower the potential transaction  costs  associated  with buying or selling capital'
Alternatively,  it can  be as.u*ed that even  such  a firm's shares  are subject  to transaction  costs,  and
so there would never  be any need  for such  a firm.
It should  also  be noted  thar  equation  (6) implies  that if in any  period the Purchases  ofassets  by new
entrants equals  the arnount  sold  by agents-leaving  the emnomy' then eisting  agents  are neither
purchasing  or selling  assets.
7.  It is easy  to show  for the stochastic  as  well as the non-stochastic  versions  of the economy  that
there exists  a unique distribution for the distribution  of capital  holdings  across  the population'
26g.  The problem with employing  the usual  type of convex  transaction  cost technologies,  such as
quadratic,  is that the ^urgirril  .ist  of altering  an.  agent's_  portfolio is increasing  in the number of
units transacted.  This is counterfactual. If aiything, brotlrs  give  quantity discounts  so one could
more accurately  argue  that these  costs  should  be concave.  Employing  concave  transactlon  cosls  ls
very problemaiic slnce  the agents'  optimization probl"rn then ceases  to have convex  constraints,
N"i"'rth"l"rr,  it is hoped thai the constant  costs  used  in this paper will help to give.some  insight
as  to ho* rraiious  tax  policies  might  influence  the  behavior  of the asset  market  variables-
9, The value function associated  with this problem  is given  in the Appendix'
10. The cases  of p > 0, and p < 0 are considered  separately  here'  Although the agent  Sets  to
indirectly decide  whether p is positive  or negative  by his decision  to purchase  or sell assets,  he
obviously does not influence the magnitrrde  of  lpl.  Througho.ut  the. numerical .results' 
the
following approach  is adopted. First f  > 0 is postJated and it will then be investigated  to see  if
the ageni's'behavior  is consistent  with this assumption  (i.e.  whether  they actually  purchase  assets)'
Then-p < 0 is postulated,  and it is seen  if the agent's  behavior  is consistent  with this assumption'
It turns  out thal in equilibrium for the numerical  models  under  study,  th€ agent's  behavior  is always
consistent  with the assumption  p < 0, but never  with p > 0'  That is, for the proposed  parameter
specification,  in equitibrium, if p > ois postulated,  th'e  agent  then chooses  to sell assets,  which is
inconsistent  with [  > O. On thi  other hand,  if p < 0 is postulated,  ihe agent  then chooses  to sell
assets  (but of a different quantity),  which is consistent  with p < 0'
11.  This was the value chosen  by Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) as well.  of  course th€ rate of
turnover or velocity is not the same  foi;ll  assets,  but this serves  as one empirical munterPart to
the variable determined  by the model. Of murse, this should  serve  as an estimate  of the upper
limit of the rate of turnover.  In the model agents  do not trade in assets  so as to change  their
portfolio structure,  since  there is really  only one assel. In a world where there are many assets'
ffiC  tt""r""ti"*  in one asset  would likely lead to increased  trade in other assets  in which the
transactions  were not taxed.
12.
be.
Furthermore, it is not clear  exactly  what the empirical  counterParts  to these  variables  should
13. It should  be noted that there  appears  to be an inverse  relationship  between  the required  values
ofcr andp in the table. This occuri Lecause  if the  agents  discount  factorp is raised'  this makes  him
care more about his future utility and he will then wish to save  more in the way of assets- To
generate  the required  level  of traie in assets,  the parameter  d must  then rise in order to encourage
ih" ugent  to save  less  to offset the rise  in the discount  factor'
14. It is important  to note  here  that  the  value  of p = -p  is less  than  zero'  and  that an  increase  in
the transaction  tax amounts  to a further lowering  of p.  This leads existing  agents  to sell less  of
their capital holdings,  and hence  raises  the prici  of capital.  However, the elasticitv of P, with
r€spect  io either w.-or r, is independent  of p.  Hence  thJ volatility of P, that results  from changes
in either  w, or r,  will not depend  on the  level  of p.
15. Of course,  the longer the agent  holds  the asset,  the closer  will be the return net of transaction
costs,  to the return  ignoring  transaction  costs.
2716. Note that since  this initial tax does  not distort any future decision,  it could be interPreted  as
a lump-sum  tax.
l7 .  This type of  tax is slightly different from what one might observe actual govemments
implementing. In the present  context,  if the price  of capital  rises,  the agent  immediately  pays  a tax
on the increaie  in the value  of their asset  holdings. In reality,  the agent  might be able to postpone
paying  the tax until the assets  had been sold. However,  modelling  and studying  this.  latter policy
is very problematic  since  there  would be an explosion  in the proliferation of state  variables  for the
agenis optimization  problem. It would then  be necessary  to keep  track of each  agent's  assets,  and
when they  were purchased,  and at what price. Purchase  of assets  would then depend  on how they
would influence  ihe tax liability much later in ihe agent's  life under all states  of the wqrld.  It is
hoped that the approximation  employed  in this paper  will leld  some  insights  into the imPact  of
other versions  of capital  gains  taxes.
However,  it can  be shown  that the scheme  analyzed  in this paper  is equivalent  to a tax  which is paid
only when assets  are sold, providing the govemment  charges/pays  interest on all previous  capital
gains  and  losses  throughout  the agent's  life, In fact,  such  a scheme  presently  does  exist. Investors
ivho purchase  long-term discount  bonds,  for which the return is fully in the form of  capital gains
since  there is no interest,  must pay tax on the imolied interest  on the bond over the tax year.
18. Another interesting  feature is that if the stochastic  process  for w, and r, are such that these
variables  individually follow martingales,  then the price given by (7) will also be a martingale.
However,  if a capital  gains  tax  is introduced,  then the price  as  given  by equation  (14) will in general
not be a martingale.
19. In this case,  this rate of return is calculated  as  if the asset  were purchased  at the beginning  of
one year,  and held for exactly  four quarters  and  then sold  and the required taxes  were paid on the
assets.
28TABLE  I
Change  the transaction  cost  (0) from lVo to 37o
F = '999s







Vo change  in
average  price of
capital
14.lVo 14SVo 14.\Vo 15.4Vo
96  change  in
average  volume
-12.67o -l2.7Vo -13.iVo -l3.3Vo
96  change  in st.
dev.  of volume
-9.3% -9.4% -9  SVo -70.0Vo
change  in Ro -.5Vo -SVo --J"/o -SVo
change  in sl.
dev.  of Ro
-0.lVo -0.7vo -0.ZVo 0.\Vo
change  in R. -4.6Vo -4.67o -4.67o -4.6Vo
change  in st.
dw. of R.
-O.9Vo -O.9Vo -1.07o 4.9Vo
avera8e
transaction costs
as 70 0f lolal
consumption
0.42Vo O.!9Vo 0.28Vo O.l3Vo
Ro  refers  to the annual  rate of return ignoring  lransaction  cosls.









% change  in
average  price of
capital
34.5Vo 34.6Vo 35.87o 37.4Vo
Vo change  it
average volume
-25.77o -E.$Vo -26.4% -27.\Vo
70  change  in st.
dev.  of volurne
-20.OVo -20.07o -20.6% -2l.4Vo
change  ir  Rb -lnTo -1.tVo -l.7Vo -7.lVo
change  in sl.
dev.  of R5
-03Vo -02Vo -0.3V" -Ojl./o
change  in R. -9.7Vo -9.lVo -9.lVo -9.1V"
chatrge in sl.
dw.  of R.
-7.9Vo -r.8% -l.9Vo -l.7Vo
average
transaction  costs
as % of total
consumPtion
0  30V" 0.66% 0.69Vo 0.22Vo
TABLE 2
Change  the transaction  mst (0) from llo  lo 1Vo
Ro  refers  lo the annual  rate of return ignoring  transaction  costs.
R" refers to lhe annual  rate of return net of transaclion  cosls.
TABLE 3
Different welfare  costs  of various  transactions  cos's
a=.0716,F=.99.
* - Welfare cosi is measured  as  lhe equivalent  tax on initial wealth  that would leave  the agent  equally  ]'ell-
otf. but io an e vironmert in which  there  were  no transactions  costs  at all, resulting  in a different distribution
of rates  of return  shrce  the translctions  costs  are  abse[l.
0=.01 0=.03 a=.05
Welfare cost'
(average  revenue  as  a









Effect of differenr  capital  gains  taxes  and subsidies
r=.05 r= .10
Eo change  in average Price of
Capital
-.0?2/o -.045Vo
Change  in the 7o  variability  of
the Price  of Capilal
-3.l7o 4.8Vo
Eo chanle in average volume -0.2&Vo -0.32Vo
E" ch^r.p.e  in st, dev- of volume 300Vo 474/o
change  in average  Rb -0.84Vo -l.23Vo
change  in st. dev of Rb -O.84Vo
change in average R6 -l.06Vo -7.60V"
change  in st. dev of R" -5.69Vo -9.04%i
a=.0665,F=.9.
Ro  refers  lo the annual  rate of return ignorhg taxes.
R. refers  to the annual  rate of return net of taxes.
TABLE 5
Serial  correlation resulting  from tbe capital  gains  taxes  and subsidies-
r=0.0 r=0.5 r = 0.10
Serial  correlalion of




Eo  chan1e  in average  Price  of
Capital
-2.ZVo -3i7\Vo
Change  in lhe 7a  variability  of
the Price  of Capital
-1.67Vo -2.7|Vo
Vo change in average  volume -0.61Vo -o.957"
Eo chal'ge in st. dev. of volume 409Vo 745Va
chaDge  in average  Rb -0.l5Vo -0.55Vo
change  in st. dev of Rb -2.297o -3.86V"
change  in average  Rr -0.u% -7.47Vo
change  itr st. dev of R. -0.u% -L.47Vo
average  lax revenue  as a
percentage  of total
@nsumption
2.\Vo 3.6Vo
equivalent  wealth tax
(resulting  revenue)'
A.48Vo  (3.38Vo) o.44Vo  Q.O$%)
TABLE 6
Effect of different capital  gains  tanes  alone
a = .0665,0  =.9.
Ro  refers  lo the annual  rate of relurn ignoring  taxes.
R. refers to the annual  rale of return net of taxes.
'  This is lhe average  lax revenue  as  a percentage  of aggregare  consumPtion  lhat arises  from aPPlying  the
relevant  lax rate to the initial wealth of all newly  enlering agents  in the economy'
TABLE  7
Serial  correlation  resulting  from the capital  gains  laxes  alone
r=0.0 r = 0.05 r = 0.10
Serial correlation  of
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Transaction  Cost 'l.Vo
nL
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